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Legislative Comments
Government Code 800 Reimbursement
of Counsel Fees
A decade ago the commission on poverty reported: "A system of
justice that attempts, in mid-twentieth century America, to meet
the needs of the financially incapacitated . . . through primary or
exclusive reliance on the uncompensated services of counsel will
prove unsuccessful and inadequate"'-and it has. The more sys-
tematic charity approach of the legal aid organizations is also inade-
quate. There, ability to have "one's day in court" really depends
on one's ability to qualify for welfare. This makes our concept of
legal rights meaningless to the majority of the financially incapaci-
tated: a matter of grace, not justice, to those who qualify.
This country is now very nearly alone in failing to allow counsel
fees to the victorious litigant.2 Almost everywhere else in the world
the chance of recovering counsel fees, however modest, from the
losing opponent is a strong inducement for the lawyer to take on a
meritorious case without regard to his client's affluence.
In California, the general rule is that, absent specific statutory
authorization, the Court award of attorneys' fees is barred. 3 How-
1. REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN.'S COMM'N ON PovERTY AND THE AD-
INISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, at 41-42 (1963).
2. A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966).
3. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1021 (West 1955).
ever, there are exceptions to the general rule. In proper cases and
where justice requires it, Courts of equity will allow attorneys'
fees as part of the relief granted.4  However, without statutory
authorization, the awarding of attorneys' fees is speculative and not
a matter of right. In the absence of a complete reform of our law
of counsel fees, a partial solution is to increase the areas in which
actions will be fee generating through act of the legislature.
The most recent California statute authorizing attorneys' fees is
Government Code Section 800. This section provides:
In any civil action to appeal or review the award, finding, or other
determination of any administrative proceeding under this code or
under any other provision of state law, except actions resulting
from actions of the State Board of Control, where it is shown that
the award, finding, or other determination of such proceeding was
the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public
entity or an officer thereof in his official capacity, the complainant
if he prevails in the civil action may collect reasonable attorney's
fees, but not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500),
where he is personally obligated to pay such fees, from such pub-
lic entity, in addition to any other relief granted or other costs
awarded.
This section is ancillary only, and shall not be construed to create
a new cause of action.
Refusal by a public entity or officer thereof to admit liability pur-
suant to a contract of insurance shall not be considered arbitrary
or capricious action or conduct within the meaning of this action.5
(Emphasis added).
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
This statute was introduced as Assembly Bill 1074 of the 1971
Legislative Session by Assemblyman John Stull, who stated:
I am personally aware of several instances in which individual
citizens have been forced to appeal an administrative decision
through the courts [and] then having won their appeal, they had
no way to recover the costs which they incurred in retaining an
attorney. This bill provides for such recovery, so that an agency
will have to pay for its mistake and assume this bill is to . . .
provide a measure of equity to the wronged citizen.6
When introduced, the bill was supported by the California Trial
Lawyers Association and opposed by the following agencies: The
Department of Finance, The Department of Public Works, The
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, The Department of Gen-
4. Estate of Olmstead, 120 Cal. 447, 453, 52 P. 804, 806 (1898). See
also Sanger v. Ryan, 122 Cal. 52, 54 P. 522 (1898); Estate of Phelps, 132
Cal. App. 2d 850, 283 P.2d 293 (1955).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West 1972).
6. Assembly John Stull's (now State Senator) Press Release, Novem-
ber 18, 1971.
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eral Services, The State Board of Equalization, The Franchise Tax
Board, and The Irrigation Districts Association of California.
II. SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 800
WHAT IS AN "ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING"? The
concern implicit in this question is whether every determination
by an officer or employee acting in an administrative capacity is an
administrative proceeding. Clearly, the answer to that question is
no. The California Legislative Counsel has defined an administra-
tive proceeding.7 They state, by way of example, that the arbitrary
refusal of a public officer to grant a license is not an administrative
proceeding, while the appeal of that refusal to an administrative
body is. Therefore, in that example, a complainant could collect
reasonable attorney's fees for bringing a civil action to review the
appeal proceeding upholding the refusal to grant the license.
This would then appear to apply to civil actions to review appeals
of denial of unemployment benefits and state aid of all kinds
(Medi-Cal, ATD, etc.) as well as wrongful dismissal from state em-
ployment.
III. CASE LAW ON GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 800
Only one California case has appeared at the appellate level since
March 4, 1972, the effective date of the statute. In Olsen v. Hick-
man8 the Court found that the scope of Government Code Sec-
tion 800 extended to actions of a county assessor in discharging
an employee from a Civil Service position. This decision was reached
over objections by defendant's counsel that Government Code Sec-
tion 800 did not apply to local agency decisions.9 Furthermore, the
defense argued that, even if the statute did apply, acting in a dis-
criminatory manner was not arbitrary and capricious as described
by Government Code Section 800.10
In prior cases the Courts have held that an administrative act
... is arbitrary when it is based on no more than the will or de-
7. Opinion and Analysis of George Murphy, Legislative Counsel of
California, Costs in Administrative Proceedings-# 15138, July 18, 1972,
regarding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800.
8. Olson v. Hickman, 25 Cal. App. 3d 920, 120 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1972).
9. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Olson v. Hick-
man, 25 Cal. App. 3d 920, 120 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1972).
10. Id.
sire of the decision-maker and not supported by a fair or substantial
reason."'" "Arbitrary" generally means, therefore, acting without
adequate determining principle. Actions can, thus, be discrimina-
tory and not necessarily capricious or arbitrary.
Relying on a previously unpublished opinion' 2 the Olsen Court
ruled that "discriminatory" actions would fulfill the necessary cri-
teria for "arbitrary" encompassed by Government Code Section 800.
The essence of this decision, therefore, is an extension of the mean-
ing of the word arbitrary to include discriminatory.
IV. EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 800
Until this provision became law, it was clear that persons success-
fully appealing from adverse administrative decisions were not en-
titled to collect attorneys' fees from the administrative agency.
Counsel for appellants were compensated, if at all, pursuant to their
private agreements with their client. Private attorneys were re-
luctant, therefore, to take cases for the financially incapacitated.
"It is virtually unheard of for a private firm to handle a mandamus
challenge to an adverse welfare 'fair hearing' decision-except that
very occasionally a firm which does charity work may take such
a case on a charitable basis.' '3
Government Code Section 800 makes services of private counsel
more available to needy citizens in this one area of law. In addi-
tion, it makes available to the private counsel a financially and
morally rewarding area of practice until now virtually untapped.
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11. Clack v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 275 Cal. App.
2d 743, 747, 80 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1969).
12. Olson v. Hickman, Civil No. 12982 (3d Appellate District, Sacra-
mento, filed February 28, 1972).
13. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, at 2, Declaration
of Thomas J. Mack, Russell v. State Department of Social Welfare, No.
219590 (Superior Court, Sacramento, State of California, filed April 18,
1972).
